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Abstract
This contribution starts out by noting a conflict of interest between consumers and
insurers. Consumers face positive correlation in their assets (health, wealth, wisdom,
i.e. skills), causing them to demand a great deal of insurance coverage. Insurers on the
other hand eschew positively correlated risks. It can be shown that insurance contributes
to a reduction of their asset volatility only if unexpected deviations of payments from
expected value correlate negatively across lines of insurance. Analyzing deviations from
trend in aggregate insurance payments, one finds the following for the United States and
Switzerland. Private U.S. but not Swiss insurance has a hedging effect for consumers,
while both social insurance schemes expose consumers to excess asset volatility. In the
insurance systems of both countries, the private component fails to offset deviations
in the social component (and vice versa). As to the supply of insurance, cointegration
analysis indicates the absence of common trends. Therefore, insurance companies could
offer combined policies to the benefit of consumers, hedging their underwriting risks both
domestically and internationally.
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1 Introduction
This paper deals with a potential conflict between consumers and insurers which arises from
their respective risk management objectives. Individuals as the potential purchasers of insurance
need to manage three assets over their life cycle, health, wealth, and wisdom (skills of value in
the labor market). Impulses impinging on these three assets tend to be positively correlated,
serving to boost demand for insurance by risk-averse individuals. However, to the extent that
benefits paid deviate from expected value (due to clauses in the small print on the one hand and
customer accommodation policy on the other), these deviations should be negatively correlated
across the different types of insurance held by an individual.
Insurers on their part shy away from covering risks that are positively correlated. While diversi-
fied shareholders might opt for the increase in total variance of underwriting results, they likely
are concerned with the demand reaction of existing policyholders who dislike the increased risk
of insolvency (Cummins and Sommer [1996]). Moreover, profitability may suffer because of the
need for additional reserves to maintain solvency. Finally, management (having most of their
wealth and wisdom tied to the company) seeks to limit underwriting risk.
This paper purports to find out whether deviations of actual from expected insurance payments
are indeed positively correlated across lines of insurance, which would serve to enhance demand
but hamper supply, thus creating a conflict of interest between consumers and insurers. As in
earlier work by Zweifel [2000] and Zweifel and Lehmann [2001], the investigation is carried out
at the aggregate level. Deviations from expected value are associated with differences between
observed and trend values of insurance payments. The countries studied are the United States
and Switzerland for maximum contrast. Apart from the fact that the U.S. economy is 35 times
bigger than the Swiss, there are important institutional differences. While private insurance
in the United States has been rather competitive, a tight cartel imposed uniform products
and premiums in Switzerland until 1992. In turn, Swiss social health insurance is individually
contracted whereas U.S. employers (except small businesses) are mandated to offer health in-
surance policies as a fringe benefit to their workers. Compared to earlier research, the present
contribution has a much longer observation period (22 years or more), permitting improved
tests for long-term trends. The absence of common trends in insurance payments would indi-
cate a possibility for insurers to hedge their underwriting portfolio domestically or even across
countries.
The next section (section 2) presents the relevant literature regarding demand for insurance in
the presence of multiple risks and develops a test showing whether insurance payments reduce
or increase volatility of personal assets. Section 3 describes the data, while section 4 explains
the empirical approach. Section 5 shows the short-term and sections 6 and 7 the long-term
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results. Section 8 concludes.
2 Multiple risks: theory and stylized facts
2.1 Multiple risks in insurance economics
Multiple risks are of relevance for both the demand and supply of insurance. On the demand
side, the classics by Arrow [1971] and Mossin [1968] show the conditions for demand for coverage
to be positive if the relevant loss is associated with just one source of risk. Ideally, the contract
would cover every possible loss regardless of its cause. However, both problems of asymmetric
information (potential for both adverse selection and moral hazard) and regulation have pre-
vented the writing of such contracts. The result is that markets for insurance are incomplete;
see e.g. Doherty and Schlesinger [1983b], Mayers and Smith, Jr. [1983], Schlesinger and Doherty
[1985], as well as Gollier and Schlesinger [1995] for an analysis of such markets.
Doherty and Schlesinger [1983b] and Eeckhoudt and Kimball [1992] show that independent
insurance payments are suboptimal from the viewpoint of the consumer even in the case where
losses are independent of each other. With two positively correlated losses, demand for insurance
coverage is higher than in the case of independent losses, as demonstrated by Doherty and
Schlesinger [1983a].
For insurers on the other hand, hedging their underwriting risks by combining lines of insurance
that are negatively correlated seems natural. Positive correlation requires additional reserves
for solvency and thus limits the supply of insurance. However, this argument overlooks three
facts. First, assuming that insurers want to limit volatility, they can still hedge by holding
assets that are positively correlated with their liabilities. After all, investment income impor-
tantly contributes to the bottom line of most companies. Second, as long as increased risk goes
along with increased profitability, an insurance company may still be attractive to investors.
The CAPM applied to insurance indicates that the underwriting beta is of crucial importance
(Zweifel and Eisen [2003, ch. 6.2]; Zweifel and Auckenthaler [2006]). Finally, it is not clear
that the owners of a company want management to eschew risk. Shareholders hold a call op-
tion whose value increases with the variance of the underlying, and it is the negative demand
response of (informed) insurance purchasers that exerts a counter influence. However, Cum-
mins and Sommer [1996] present empirical evidence suggesting that this counter effect is strong
enough to cause insurers to limit their risk exposure. In sum, positive correlation of risks makes
consumers increase their demand for insurance coverage but insurers to reduce their supply.
These contradicting responses point to a conflict of interest.
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2.2 How are assets of individuals correlated?
Individuals own three assets, health, wealth and wisdom (skills generating labor income). They
are subject to impulses that lead to variations in the total value of their portfolios.
Table 1 presents the seven impulses that are typically distinguished in (social) insurance, along
with their hypothesized correlations. The impulses considered are illness, accident, disability,
old age, unemployment, increase of family size, and death of the main breadwinner. Table 1
can be read as follows. Given that someone is old (I4), there is probably a negative effect on
increase in family size (I6). This points to a negative partial correlation. Family size in turn does
not affect age; therefore, total correlation is negative. If on the other hand someone is sick at
home in bed (I1), he or she is unlikely to cause an accident (I2), a negative partial correlation.
However, it could also be that bad health is a result of an accident, a positive partial correlation.
It is hypothesized that total correlation tends to be negative in this case since the first effect
probably dominates.
Table 1: Impulses and their hypothesized correlations
I1 I2 I3 I4 I5 I6 I7
I1: Illness
I2: Accident -?
I3: Disability - +
I4: Old age + + +?
I5: Unemployment + +? +? +?
I6: Increase in family size +? 0 0 - +?
I7: Death of main breadwinner - - - + 0? 0
+ positive correlation; - negative correlation; 0 no correlation; ? unclear correlation
Table 2 matches the seven impulses considered to the three assets affected. For instance, disabil-
ity (I3) is assumed to have a strong influence on all three assets, while old age (I4) is hypothesized
to influence health and wisdom but not wealth due to the fact that after retirement, wealth
varies little with age (retired individuals consuming just about their pension).
Combining the entries in table 1 and table 2, one sees that the three assets are likely to be
positively correlated. Empirical research appears to support this notion. Bartel and Taubman
[1979], Mitchell [1990], and Ettner [1996] establish a positive correlation between health and
wealth. Rosen and Taubman [1982] and Ashenfelter and Rouse [1998] find a positive relationship
between wealth and wisdom, whereas Grossman [1975] and Kenkel [1991] present empirical
evidence to the effect that wisdom and health are positively correlated.
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Table 2: Impacts of impulses on individual assets
Health Wealth Wisdom
I1: Illness ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
I2: Accident ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
I3: Disability ∗∗ ∗∗ ∗∗
I4: Old age ∗ 0 ∗
I5: Unemployment ∗ ∗∗ ∗
I6: Increase in family size ∗ ∗∗ ∗
I7: Death of main breadwinner ∗ ∗∗ 0
∗∗ strong effect; ∗ medium effect; 0 no effect
Positive correlations between assets can lead to vicious cycles. Absent insurance, a person suf-
fering a health loss will not only experience a drain on financial wealth but also have less
opportunity to maintain the level of wisdom (through professional training). An optimal insur-
ance system should avoid such vicious cycles by offsetting these losses. It is therefore important
to determine how payments of insurance are correlated.
2.3 An application of portfolio theory
Since the seminal contribution of Markowitz [1959], it is accepted that risk-averse individuals
seek to maximize expected return (µ) on their portfolio subject to a given amount of volatility
(σ), i.e. attaining their efficient portfolio frontier in (µ, σ)-space. Now the different private and
social insurance policies held by consumers can be viewed as assets constituting a portfolio. Since
premiums are non-stochastic by and large, they will be ignored in the following. Payments, on
the other hand contain a stochastic element for the insured. For example, ignored or forgotten
clauses in the small print in private insurance and missing contribution years or change of
employers in social insurance may cause payments to be below expected value. Conversely,
consumer accommodation policy sometimes results in benefits that are higher than could be
expected. In sum, there is reason for volatility in payments (σ > 0).
Turning to expected returns (µ), there could considerably be differences between the different
lines of insurance and particularly between private and social insurance. The rate of return on
private insurance policies can be equated to the risk-free rate of interest on the capital market,
while the one on social insurance can be approximated by the growth in wages, in keeping
with the seminal argument by Samuelson [1958]. However, no systematic difference between the
two rates before tax can be inferred from table 3. During the period 1960 - 2007, Switzerland,
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Table 3: Comparison of nominal rates of return on private and social insurance
1960-2007 1974-1979
Private rf Social lw Private rf Social lw
United States 6.92 6.98 8.07 10.03
Switzerland 4.27 2.49a 4.90 n.a.
Sweden 8.22 7.69 9.62 11.87
Denmark 10.01 7.70b 16.38 13.17
United Kingdom 8.58 8.55 13.01 17.04
Austria 7.09c 6.23d 8.83 10.49
Japan 5.25e 8.33 7.90 13.46
Source:OECD Economic Outlook, 2006
rf = Nominal long-term yield on government bonds; lw = Annual growth in wages and salaries
a1990-2007
b1966-2007
c1965-2007
d1970-2007
e1967-2007
Sweden, Denmark, and Austria exhibit long-term rates of interest that exceed the growth of
labor incomes, while the opposite holds true for Japan. However, during 1974 - 1979, the rate
of interest was below the growth rate of wages and salaries both in Sweden and Austria. As an
approximation, it seems legitimate to infer equality between the rates of return on private and
social insurance. The (µ, σ)-criterion can therefore be reduced to volatility (σ). Accordingly, an
ideal insurance system therefore should minimize total asset variance to which consumers are
exposed.
Suppose there are two impulses, death of main breadwinner and accidents, affecting assets X
and Y (e.g. health and wealth). Asset values in money terms, including expected payments
for claims, are labelled Xa and Y a (e.g. life insurance and accident insurance). Unexpected
deviations from expected benefits are symbolized by x and y, respectively. Total asset variance
then amounts to
Var(Xa + x+ Y a + y) =

Var(Xa)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+Var(x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+Var(Y a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+Var(y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+
2 · Cov(Xa, Y a)︸ ︷︷ ︸
+
+2 · Cov(Xa, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+2 · Cov(Xa, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+
2 · Cov(Y a, x)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+2 · Cov(Y a, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
0
+2 · Cov(x, y)︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
(1)
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Four out of the six covariances can be set to zero for the following reasons. In the case of
Cov(Xa, x) and Cov(Y a, y), this is due to the very definition of unexpected deviations (x, y). In
addition, Cov(Xa, y) and Cov(Y a, x) are (close to) zero because normally insurance covers just
one type of loss, regardless of the occurrence of another impulse. For example, premature death
usually does not trigger a payment under the title of accident insurance. As to Cov(Xa, Y a),
it is positive as long as the policies feature cost-sharing provisions because the two impulses
still result in lowered asset values. In all, the sign of Cov(x, y) proves crucial for total asset
variance. If this covariance is negative, it reduces the total amount of asset variance, if positive,
increases it. Thus, to the extent that correlations between unexpected deviations in insurance
payments are positively correlated, they expose consumers to excess asset volatility, preventing
them from reaching the efficient frontier in (µ, σ)-space.
In sum, positive correlations between stochastic deviations in insurance payments cause inef-
ficiencies in the insurance system as a whole. This conclusion forms the basis of the empirical
tests to be carried out in sections 4 to 7 below.
3 Data
The analysis deals with yearly data for insurance claims paid in the United States and Switzer-
land. They cover the period 1970 - 2004 in the case of the United States for private insurance
and from 1980 - 2001 for social insurance. The data is taken from the Life Insurers Fact Book
2003 and 2005, published by the American Council of Life Insurers. They are complemented
by information from National Health Expenditures 2003 and 2004 published by the U.S. De-
partment of Health & Human Services for the years 1960 - 2004. The data on social insurance
come from the OECD Social Expenditure Database 2004, covering 1980 to 2001.
In the case of Switzerland, the source is Die privaten Versicherungseinrichtungen in der Schweiz,
published by the Federal Agency for Private Insurance (Bundesamt fu¨r Privatversicherung) for
the years 1975 - 2004. Data on benefits paid by social insurance again come from the OECD
Social Expenditure Database 2004, covering the years 1980 - 2001. Explanations and labels for
lines of insurance distinguished are given in the appendix.
The information on GDP was taken from the national accounts statistics’ published by the
OECD, who revised the pre- 1989 figures for Switzerland. The data for the Swiss GDP is
estimated from 1989 backwards. Comparison with the data provided by the Swiss Statistical
Office shows them to be almost identical. To keep matters simple, all data was taken from one
source; they are in millions of national currency throughout.
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4 Econometric specification
The most simple way to obtain time series estimates of unexpected short-term deviations from
expected values is to define them as deviations from trend. Aggregate insurance payments
increase progressively over time due to inflation. The estimation procedure therefore includes a
linear and a quadratic time trend to accept for inflation. The same regression equation is used
for all insurance lines,
Ii,t = βi,1 + βi,2 · Tt + βi,3 · T 2t + ²i,t, (2)
where I is payment in insurance line i, t denotes the year of observation, Tt is the time trend,
and ²i,t is the error term.
The first objective is to identify short-term correlations between regression residuals since indi-
viduals as well as insurers try to avoid positive correlations. In Zweifel [2000] as well as Zweifel
and Lehmann [2001], positive correlations between payments prevail for the period 1975 - 1993.
A regression system for private, social, and both private and social insurance is estimated. This
amounts to three regression systems for each country. Since numbers of observations differ,
longer time series are reduced to the length of the shortest one. For the case of U.S. private
insurance, the system reads,

PLIDt
PLIDIt
PLAIt
PHIt
PHI2t

=

β1,PLID β2,PLID β3,PLID
β1,PLIDI β2,PLIDI β3,PLIDI
β1,PAI β2,PAI β3,PAI
β1,PHI β2,PHI β3,PHI
β1,PHI2 β2,PHI2 β3,PHI2

·

1
Tt
T 2t
+

²PLID,t
²PLIDI,t
²PAI,t
²PHI,t
²PHI2,t

, (3)
with E(²²′) = Ω. A Breusch-Pagan chi-square test indicates that Ω cannot be considered diag-
onal; therefore, the error terms are correlated across equations.
Next, each equation is estimated individually for each line of insurance in order to maximize
the number of observations. The calculation of pairwise correlations between residuals indicates
whether unexpected negative (positive) deviations from trend in one line occur along with
negative (positive) deviations from trend in another line of insurance within a given year. This
is interpreted as positive short-term correlation at the level of the individual insured; for a
discussion of possible errors of aggregation, see Zweifel [2000].
To analyze the common long-term trends that may characterize insurance payments, a coin-
tegration analysis using the GDP as the cointegration variable is performed [Greene, 2003,
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ch. 20.4.3]. First, time series need to be tested for their stationarity. Usually, one uses first dif-
ferences; however, the objective here is to identify common trends rather than avoiding spurious
correlation in a specifying a model explaining the development of claims paid. Therefore, the
variables are left in levels. Next, since two time series can only be cointegrated if they are of the
same order, the integration order of each series is checked and reported. Finally, an augmented
Engle-Granger test that accepts the null hypothesis of no cointegration will be sufficient to
conclude that the two variables have no common trend. Critical values are taken from David-
son and MacKinnon [1993, ch. 20.6]. If on the other hand the null hypothesis is rejected, then
cointegration may be inferred even though strictly speaking it has not been verified [Greene,
2003, pg. 656]. So whenever the residuals of equation (4) below exhibit stationary properties, a
common trend can be said to exist:
Ii,t = γ1 + γ2 ·GDPt + µi,t, (4)
with µi,t assumed i.i.d. This choice can be justified for two reasons. First, with income elasticities
above one and rate elasticities low for major lines of insurance [SwissReinsurance [1989]], It is
likely to be dominated by movements in GDPt. Second, testing for cointegration with GDP is far
easier than using one, several, or all remaining lines of insurance as variables of cointegration
(however see section 7 below). The residuals serve as input to the augmented test based on
a specification without a trend variable. The auxiliary regression then reads (dropping the i
subscript for simplicity),
(µˆt − µˆt−1) = ϕ2 · µˆt−1 + ϕ3 · (µˆt−1 − µˆt−2) + νt, (5)
with νt assumed i.i.d. Estimated parameters ϕ2 and ϕ3 provide an indication of whether It
and GDPt show some form of common trend. If this should be the case for several lines of
insurance, then their payments would tend to move parallel in the longer term, permanently
subjecting the insured to extra volatility of their assets. In addition, insurers would have no
opportunity to combine the lines affected in order to hedge their underwriting risk within the
country considered.
However, increasingly insurance companies operate internationally, which provides them with
opportunities for global diversification. Therefore, as a last step, an additional cointegration
analysis involving the private lines of U.S. and Swiss insurance is performed in section 7. If
unexpected deviations of payments show a common trend across countries, then global diver-
sification within the same line of insurance is possible. Since social insurance will continue to
be national schemes for some time to come, this last step applies to private insurance in the
United States and Switzerland only.
Correlated Risks 9
5 Analysis of short-term correlations
The short-term analysis tries to ascertain whether deviations from expected value of claims
paid are positively or negatively correlated across different lines of insurance within the same
country (see equation 1). Section 5.1 deals with the United States, while section 5.2 is devoted
to Switzerland.
5.1 United States
The evidence for the United States derived from the trend estimations are presented in tables 4
to 6. In private insurance (table 4), four out of ten correlations are significantly negative and
just two are positive. Interestingly, it is payments of private health insurance as reported by
the U.S. Department of Health & Human Services (PHI2), which cover the years 1960 - 2004
(rather than 1970 - 2004 as in the case of (PHI)) that correlates negatively with three of the
other private insurance lines, viz. private life insurer’s death payments (PLID), health insurance
written by life insurers (PHI), and their annuity payments (PLAI). Disability payments (PLIDI)
and annuity payments (PLAI) provided by life insurers also correlate negatively with each other.
Table 4: Correlations of trend deviations in U.S. private insurance, 1965 - 2004
PLID PLIDI PLAI PHI PHI2
PLID 1.000
PLIDI −0.0534 1.000
(0.7435)
PLAI −0.0227 −0.3417∗ 1.000
(0.8896) (0.0282)
PHIa 0.4830∗∗ 0.1358 0.4584∗∗ 1.000
(0.0033) (0.4366) (0.0056)
PHI2b −0.3514∗ 0.2105 −0.4383∗∗ −0.5516∗∗ 1.000
(0.0262) (0.1922) (0.0047) (0.0006)
*,** coefficient significant at the five and one percent level, respectively
Note: The time series PHI and PHI2 refer to the same type of payments; only the source of data differs.
Therefore, the negative correlation between the two is puzzling.
a1970 - 2004
b1960 - 2004
On the other hand, deviations in payments for health insurance by private life insurers (PHI)
correlate positively with those in death (PLID) and annuity (PLAI) payments. This indicates
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a part of insurance business where consumers would benefit from risk diversification. One way
could be to offer them combined policies; however, insurers appear to be unwilling to write
such policies. On the whole, however, U.S. purchasers of private insurance are exposed to little
excessive risk.
Table 5: Correlations of trend deviations in U.S. social insurance, 1980 - 2004
SDCB SWCB SOACB SPSB SSB SFCB SUB SHB
SDCB 1.000
SWCB 0.9336∗∗ 1.000
(0.0000)
SOACB 0.3033 0.0989 1.000
(0.1700) (0.6615)
SPSB 0.3115 0.3846 0.3477 1.000
(0.1582) (0.0771) (0.1128)
SSB 0.7867∗∗ 0.6613∗∗ 0.4395∗ −0.1444 1.000
(0.0000) (0.0008) (0.0407) (0.5215)
SFCB 0.7769∗∗ 0.7101∗∗ 0.2728 −0.0626 0.8888∗∗ 1.000
(0.0000) (0.0002) (0.2193) (0.7821) (0.0000)
SUB 0.6085∗∗ 0.6291∗∗ 0.4030 0.5833∗∗ 0.3508 0.2444 1.000
(0.0027) (0.0017) (0.0629) (0.0044) (0.1094) (0.2730)
SHB 0.9443∗∗ 0.8588∗∗ 0.3194 0.1141 0.8884∗∗ 0.8863∗∗ 0.4690∗ 1.000
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.1473) (0.6132) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0277)
*,** coefficient significant at the five and one percent level, respectively
In U.S. social insurance, the picture is quite different, as evidenced in table 5. Social disability
benefits (SDCB), worker’s compensation (SWCB), survivor’s (SSB) and health (SHB) benefits
show five significant positive correlations. Old age (SOACB), paid sick leave (SPSB), family cash
(SFCB) and unemployment (SUB) benefits all show at least one significant positive correlation.
In total 15 (or 54 percent) out of 28 correlations are significantly positive, the coefficients ranging
from 0.44 to 0.94. Just two correlations indicate a negative relationship. U.S. social insurance
thus seems to contribute little to asset stability for consumers. This result is in keeping with
findings reported in Zweifel [2000], whose data base did not include OECD sources.
Table 6 shows the cross-correlations between private and social insurance. The only line of pri-
vate insurance showing significant (positive) correlation is health insurance (PHI2) as reported
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Therefore, while U.S. private insurance
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fails to consistently make up for unexpected shortfalls in the benefits of its social counterpart
(and vice versa), it at least does not cause much excess asset volatility for consumers.
In sum, U.S. private insurance seems to considerably reduce the volatility of personal assets,
contrary to social insurance which may well expose consumers to excess volatility. The interplay
between private and social insurance does not alleviate the problem, leaving asset volatility
unaffected.
Table 6: Correlations of trend deviations in U.S. private and social insurance, 1980 - 2004
PLID PLIDI PLAI PHI PHI2
SDCB 0.1436 0.2790 −0.1358 0.2016 0.5015∗
(0.5239) (0.2086) (0.5467) (0.3682) (0.0174)
SWCB −0.0211 0.3357 −0.1055 0.1521 0.5314∗
(0.9256) (0.1266) (0.6403) (0.4993) (0.0109)
SOACB −0.0268 0.0604 −0.2457 −0.2593 0.2701
(0.9058) (0.7895) (0.2704) (0.2440) (0.2240)
SPSB −0.3367 −0.1628 −0.3591 −0.4135 0.4683∗
(0.1255) (0.4690) (0.1007) (0.0558) (0.0280)
SSB 0.2115 0.3337 0.0304 0.3112 0.2641
(0.3447) (0.1290) (0.8931) (0.1586) (0.2349)
SFCB 0.1113 0.3175 0.0619 0.3054 0.2840
(0.6218) (0.1500) (0.7845) (0.1670) (0.2003)
SUB −0.3437 0.0431 −0.3343 −0.3070 0.5746∗∗
(0.1173) (0.8488) (0.1284) (0.1647) (0.0052)
SHB 0.2407 0.3455 −0.1405 0.3005 0.3582
(0.2806) (0.1152) (0.5330) (0.1743) (0.1017)
*,** coefficient significant at the five and one percent level, respectively
5.2 Switzerland
For Switzerland, the evidence is reported in tables 7 to 9. In private insurance, there are three
(out of six) significant correlations, all positive and ranging from 0.42 to 0.72 (table 7). Two of
them are due to life insurance (PLID), one to general liability insurance (PGI). Since all the
remaining correlations suggest a positive relationship as well, it must be said that payments by
Swiss private insurance tend to increase rather than reduce the volatility of consumers’ assets.
Again, this finding is in accord with those of Zweifel [2000], although the time series used here
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cover ten more years.
Table 7: Correlations of trend deviations in Swiss private insurance, 1975 - 2004
PLID PGI PAI PHI
PLID 1.000
PGI 0.5262∗∗ 1.000
(0.0028)
PAI 0.1507 0.4153∗ 1.000
(0.4266) (0.0225)
PHI 0.7223∗∗ 0.3252 0.1763 1.000
(0.0000) (0.0795) (0.3514)
*,** coefficient significant at the five and one percent level, respectively
Table 8: Correlations of trend deviations in Swiss social insurance, 1980 - 2004
SDCB SOIB SOACB SPSB SSB SFCB SHTB SUB SHB
SDCB 1.000
SOIB 0.1408 1.000
(0.6624)
SOACB −0.1789 0.2374 1.000
(0.4257) (0.4576)
SPSB 0.1936 −0.1700 −0.0032 1.000
(0.5465) (0.5973) (0.9921)
SSB −0.3090 0.0542 0.9725∗∗ 0.0035 1.000
(0.1617) (0.8670) (0.0000) (0.9913)
SFCB 0.4735∗ 0.1712 0.5982∗∗ −0.1026 0.4949∗ 1.000
(0.0260) (0.5947) (0.0033) (0.7510) (0.0192)
SHTB −0.2508 0.2524 0.9443∗∗ 0.0692 0.9304∗∗ 0.5912∗∗ 1.000
(0.2602) (0.4288) (0.0000) (0.8309) (0.0000) (0.0038)
SUB 0.4595∗ 0.3374 0.6886∗∗ 0.0035 0.5797∗∗ 0.9617∗∗ 0.6652∗∗ 1.000
(0.0314) (0.2835) (0.0004) (0.9914) (0.0047) (0.0000) (0.0007)
SHB −0.2371 0.4868 0.7714∗∗ 0.2653 0.7536∗∗ 0.3740 0.7299∗∗ 0.5109∗ 1.0000
(0.2881) (0.1085) (0.0000) (0.4047) (0.0001) (0.0864) (0.0001) (0.0151)
*,** coefficient significant at the five and one percent level, respectively
Social insurance in Switzerland again shows a less favorable picture than in the United States.
No less than 16 out of 36 correlations are significantly positive, with a maximum value as high
as 0.97. The main source of the problem is unemployment insurance (SUB), whose benefits
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exhibit a significant relationship with six other insurance lines. This reinforces the findings of
Zweifel and Lehmann [2001], who report 6 positive out of 10 correlations for the period 1970
to 1990. Therefore, Swiss social insurance seems to cause consumers to be rather far away from
their efficient frontier in (µ, σ)-space.
Table 9 shows the cross-correlations between Swiss private and social insurance. Whereas only
one correlation coefficient is significantly negative, 6 out of 36 are clearly positive, with a
maximum of 0.75. The responsibility for this lies mainly with the benefits of private accident
insurance (PAI), which accounts for five positive relationships. Similar results were found by
Zweifel and Lehmann [2001]; they reinforce the impression that the United States insurance
system does a much better job than its Swiss counterpart when it comes to filling unexpected
shortfalls in the benefits paid by either private or social insurance.
Table 9: Correlations of trend deviations in Swiss private and social insurance, 1980 - 2004
PLID PGI PAI PHI
SDCB −0.2741 −0.3367 −0.1105 −0.3242
(0.2171) (0.1255) (0.6244) (0.1411)
SOIB 0.4159 0.2214 0.4621 0.4739
(0.1788) (0.4892) (0.1304) (0.1196)
SOACB −0.0075 0.3053 0.6116∗∗ −0.1704
(0.9735) (0.1671) (0.0025) (0.4482)
SPSB −0.2479 0.3025 0.2886 −0.0850
(0.4372) (0.3392) (0.3630) (0.7928)
SSB −0.0279 0.3226 0.5258∗ −0.1856
(0.9018) (0.1431) (0.0120) (0.4082)
SFCB −0.3094 −0.1032 0.2932 −0.5406∗∗
(0.1612) (0.6477) (0.1854) (0.0094)
SHTB −0.0529 0.3570 0.5803∗∗ −0.2590
(0.8151) (0.1029) (0.0046) (0.2445)
SUB −0.2500 −0.0132 0.4251∗ −0.4167
(0.2619) (0.9535) (0.0486) (0.0537)
SHB 0.1230 0.5396∗∗ 0.7491∗∗ 0.1940
(0.5855) (0.0096) (0.0001) (0.3869)
*,** coefficient significant at the five and one percent level, respectively
In all, the insurance system of Switzerland offers vast opportunity for efficiency improvements
both in its private and its social components. Regarding the interplay between the two, the
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insurance system of both Switzerland and the United States fail to fill the gaps in one component
by extra payments in the other.
6 Long-term analysis
Especially for the insurer, year-to-year movements of claims are of limited relevance. When
looking for hedging opportunities in their underwriting business, they need to know whether
claims tend to move parallel in the longer term. This issue calls for cointegration analysis.
Table 10: Order of integration as indicated by the standard Dickey-Fuller test
USA Switzerland
t I(1)? t I(1)?
PLID −3.859∗∗∗ I(1) −3.425∗∗ I(1)
PLIDI −10.683∗∗∗ I(1)
PLAI −6.034∗∗∗ I(1)
PHI −4.714∗∗∗ I(1) −2.847∗ I(1)
PHI2 −6.699∗∗∗ I(1)
PGI −6.737∗∗∗ I(1)
PAI −4.485∗∗∗ I(1)
SDCB −1.480 not I(1) −3.877∗∗∗ I(1)
SWCB −1.991 not I(1)
SOACB −3.557∗ I(1),trend −4.049∗∗∗ I(1)
SPSB −2.974∗ I(1) −3.411∗∗ I(1)
SSB −2.756∗ I(1) −4.148∗∗∗ I(1)
SFCB −4.109∗∗∗ I(1) −2.665∗ I(1)
SUB −4.087∗∗∗ I(1) −2.768∗ I(1)
SHB 0.033 not I(1) −1.816 not I(1)
SOIB −2.890∗ I(1)
SHTB −4.723∗∗∗ I(1)
GDP −4.035∗∗ I(1),trend −3.019∗∗ I(1)
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10, 5, 1 percent level
In cointegration analysis, the time series need to be of the same order of integration. A standard
Dickey-Fuller (DF) test applied to first differences without a time trend suggests that most of
the series are I(1) (see table 10; the critical values are based on Fuller [1976] after interpolation).
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If this test rejects the null hypothesis of a unit root, then this is reported in table 10 as I(1). If
the null hypothesis is not rejected, pointing to a higher order of integration, then an additional
DF test with a time trend is performed. In all, three U.S. and only one Swiss time series cannot
be said to be integrated of order one, i.e. I(1).
Table 11: Results of cointegration (cointegration vairable: GDP)
United States, 1975 - 2004 Switzerland, 1975 - 2004
ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID −0.2409 No −0.1441 No
PLIDI −0.4669 No
PLAI −0.2128 No
PHI −0.3648 No −0.1063 No
PHI2 −0.3092 No
PGI −0.7146a No
PAI −0.5706 No
SDCB −0.3024∗ Yes −0.0963 No
SWCB
SOACB −0.6347∗ Yes −0.1532 No
SPSB −0.2626 No −0.7492∗∗ Yes
SSB −0.2970 No −0.3212 No
SFCB −0.2712 No −0.2777 No
SUB −0.6139 No −0.4035 No
SHB −0.3082 No
SOIB −0.7511 No
SHTB −0.2793 No
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 5, 2.5, 1 percent level
asignificant at the 10 percent level
Additionally, the more powerful Dickey-Fuller GLS test (accounting for autocorrelation in the
error term) as proposed by Elliot et al. [1996] is carried. The results are presented in the
appendix; they largely coincide with those of table 10. Whenever the conclusion of both tests
is that a series is not I(1), it is excluded from the analysis below. If just one test indicates
the differenced series to have a unit root, then it is still analyzed but the results appear in
bold italics in table 11 to indicate that they need to be interpreted with caution. This testing
strategy results in the exclusion or qualification of U.S. life insurance (PLID) as well as workers’
compensation (SWCB), health insurance (SHB), disability cash benefits (SDCB), and paid sick
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leave benefits (SPSB) in U.S. social insurance. In the case of Switzerland, social health insurance
(SHB) had to be dropped.
As can easily be seen from table 11, none of the remaining lines of private insurance are cointe-
grated with the GDP of the respective country. This means that there is an absence of common
trends, creating hedging possibilities. Specifically, private U.S. health insurers might consider
writing umbrella-type policies covering several risks. Turning to social insurance, one notes that
possibly disability benefits (SDCB) and definitely old age benefits (SOACB) exhibit a common
trend with GDP. The scope for hedging thus is more limited. In the case of Switzerland, pri-
vate insurers could also create combined products that would serve to reduce asset volatility
for consumers. The same is true of social insurance, with the sole exception of paid sick leave
(SPSB), whose benefits are clearly trending with the Swiss GDP.
Finally, the question needs to be addressed of whether certain lines of private insurance are
more amenable to hedging than others. This calls for performing a cointegration analysis with
one of the other lines of insurance rather than GDP serving as the cointegration variable. In
tables 12 and 13, only domestic alternatives are considered. In the United States (table 12),
not a single line of business is cointegrated with any other, with the one possible exception
of health insurance combined with life insurers’ death payments. In Switzerland (table 13),
accident insurance (PAI) and general liability insurance (PGI) share a significant common
trend; otherwise there is no trace of parallel long-term movements.
In conclusion, payments of private insurance are predominantly devoid of common trends both
in the United States and Switzerland, providing ample opportunity to offer combined insurance
contracts. In social insurance, a few common trends can be identified which limit somewhat the
scope for umbrella-type policies.
7 Possibilities of international diversification
Increasingly, insurance companies operate globally. Therefore, it is natural to ask whether claims
development in the United States and Switzerland permit a degree of global hedging (which of
course must be of limited extent in view of the much smaller Swiss market). Again, cointegration
tests serve to provide evidence on this issue; however, contrary to section 6, they involve the
same line of business in the United States and Switzerland. If the two time series turn out not
to be cointegrated, there exists the possibility of international hedging for private multinational
insurers. For example, they could offer life insurance both in the United States and Switzerland,
benefiting from the fact that the two claims processes exhibit different trends. This choice is not
available to social insurers for some time to come, motivating this investigation to be performed
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Table 12: Cointegration of private insurance in the U.S.A.
PLID PLIDI
ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID
PLIDI −0.2330 No
PLAI −0.2796 No −0.0980 No
PHI −0.5080a No −0.1378 No
PHI2 −0.0691 No −0.4320 No
PLAI PHI
ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID
PLIDI
PLAI
PHI −0.3604 No
PHI2 −0.2353 No −0.4397 No
acoefficient significant at the 10 percent level
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 5, 2.5, 1 percent level
Table 13: Cointegration of private insurance in Switzerland
PLID PHI PGI
ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID
PHI −0.5001 No
PGI −0.1457 No −0.1770 No
PAI −0.1499 No −0.1224 No −0.8913∗ Yes
*,**,*** is significant at 5, 2.5, 1 percent level
for private insurance only.
Throughout, the U.S. variable is used as the regressor. As shown in table 14, all but one line of
business (payments for death by Swiss life insurance PLID-CH, with U.S. life insurance annuity
payments PLAI-US) are not cointegrated. These two lines of insurance are the only ones that
should not be used for diversifying the companies’ underwriting risk.
In the case of the United States and Switzerland, international diversification of the underwrit-
ing risk by private insurers therefore is entirely possible. These hedging opportunities go some
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Table 14: Cointegration tests of Swiss and U.S. lines of insurance
PLID-US PLIDI-US PLAI-US
ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID-CH −0.2520 No −0.2349 No −0.3268∗ Yes
PHI-CH −0.1986 No −0.2213 No −0.1813 No
PGI-CH −0.3960 No −0.2371 No −0.5823a No
PAI-CH −0.1750 No −0.2155 No −0.3738 No
PHI-US PHI2-US
ϕ2 Cointegrated? ϕ2 Cointegrated?
PLID-CH −0.3683 No −0.4906 No
PHI-CH −0.2278 No −0.2903 No
PGI-CH −0.4479 No −0.5736 No
PAI-CH −0.2853 No −0.2051 No
asignificant at the 10 percent level
*,**,*** is significant at 5, 2.5, 1 percent level
way towards mitigating the conflict of interest between consumers (who would like to transfer
positively correlated risks) and insurers (who eschew these risks) of the same country.
8 Conclusion
The starting point of this contribution is the argument that insurance payments contain a
stochastic element. To the extent that these elements are positively correlated, they expose
consumers to excess asset volatility. At the same time, insurers shy away from underwriting
positively correlated risks. Equating these stochastic elements to trend deviations in aggregate
insurance payments, the contribution of insurance to the reduction of consumers’ asset volatility
is reflected by the degree of negative correlation between the deviations in the different lines of
private and social insurance. However, at least in the case of the United States and Switzerland,
these deviations are found to often correlate positively, especially in Swiss social insurance. To
overcome this inefficiency, insurers in the two countries could write combined policies. However,
for this to be feasible in the long term, the claims processes must not exhibit common trends.
Cointegration tests show this to be the case almost without exception. Finally, multinational
insurers have the additional option of hedging a line of their business in the United States by
underwriting the same type of risk in another country (Switzerland for example). This again
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proves to be possible with very few exceptions.
In sum, this research suggests that consumers both in the United States and Switzerland fail
to reach their efficient frontiers in (µ, σ)-space as far as their assets ’insurance policies’ are
concerned. It also finds scope for additional hedging by private insurers, domestically as well as
globally. However, some open questions need to be addressed in future research. First, similar
investigations should be carried out for additional countries to check whether truly global hedg-
ing opportunities exist in the underwriting of personal insurance. Second, analysis of individual
data would be extremely valuable. As already discussed in Zweifel [2000], aggregation creates
the danger of finding positive correlations in the aggregate that do not exist at the individ-
ual level. Likewise, the results of the cointegration tests reported here need not carry over to
individual insurance companies. However, the results presented in this paper do seem to raise
issues of considerable importance worthy of additional research effort.
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9 Appendix
Table 15: Labels for insurance benefits, with sources
United States (P= private, S=social)
PLID Life insurer’s death payments; Life Insurers Fact Book
PLIDI Life insurer’s disability payments and retained assets; Life Insurers Fact Book
PLAI Life insurer’s annuity payments; Life Insurers Fact Book
PHI Health insurance; Life Insurers Fact Book
PHI2 Health insurance; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services
SDCB Disability cash benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SWCB Worker’s compensation cash benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SOACB Old age cash benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SPSB Paid sick leave benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SSB Survivor’s benefits total; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SFCB Family cash benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SUB Unemployment benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SHB Health benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
Switzerland (P= private, S=social)
PLID Life insurance; Bundesamt fu¨r Privatversicherungen
PGI General liability insurance; Bundesamt fu¨r Privatversicherungen
PAI Accident insurance; Bundesamt fu¨r Privatversicherungen
PHI Health insurance; Bundesamt fu¨r Privatversicherungen
SDCB Disability cash benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SOIB Accident insurance (disability and survivors); OECD Social Expenditure Database
SOACB Old age cash benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SPSB Paid sick leave benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SSB Survivor’s benefits total; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SFCB Family cash benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SHTB Housing benefits total; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SUB Unemployment benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
SHB Health benefits; OECD Social Expenditure Database
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Table 16: GLS cointegration: optimal lags and order of integration
United States Switzerland
opt.lag TSa I(?) opt.lag TSa I(?)
PLID 9 −1.840 not I(1) 3 −4.425∗∗∗ I(1),trend
PLIDI 1 −5.382∗∗∗ I(1),mean −− –
PLAI 5 −2.917∗ I(1),trend −− –
PHI 0 −5.307∗∗∗ I(1)b,trend 5 −2.629∗ I(1),trend
PHI2 0 −9.074∗∗∗ I(1)b,trend −− –
PGI −− – 1 −5.384∗∗∗ I(1),trend
PAI −− – 1 −2.383∗ I(1),mean
SDCB 4 −3.231∗∗ I(1),trend 0 −4.976∗∗∗ I(1)b,trend
SWCB 0 −1.991 not I(1) −− –
SOACB 0 −3.557∗ I(1)b,trend 0 −4.074∗∗ I(1)b,trend
SPSB 6 2.400 not I(1) 0 −3.411∗∗ I(1)b,mean
SSB 7 −4.786∗∗∗ I(1),trend 0 −4.083∗∗ I(1)b,mean
SFCB 0 −4.134∗∗ I(1)b,trend 0 −2.665∗ I(1)b,mean
SUB 7 −4.483∗∗∗ I(1),trend 0 −2.768∗ I(1)b,mean
SHB 3 −3.378∗∗ I(1),trend 0 −2.195 not I(1)
SOIB −− – 0 −3.554∗ I(1)b,trend
SHTB −− – 0 −4.704∗∗∗ I(1)b,trend
GDP 0 −4.035∗∗ I(1)b,trend 0 −3.091∗∗ I(1)b,mean
*,**,*** coefficient significant at 10, 5, 1 percent level
aTS = test-statistic
bZero lag length indicated by Ng-Perron sequential t (1995); standard Dickey-Fuller test with interpolated
critical values according to Fuller (1976)
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